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by Scott W. See
On February 5, 2003 the Maine International Trade
Center and University of Maine Canadian American
Center co-sponsored a day-long forum on the challenges
and opportunities of free trade between Canada and the
United States. In the first of two articles generated by this
forum, we present the edited remarks of Scott See, a
University of Maine Libra Professor of History, who 
gave audience members a whirlwind overview of the 
history of Canadian-American free trade from the
Revolutionary War era up to passage of the Free Trade
Agreement in 1989. We follow this article with a
companion piece written by Howard Cody, University of
Maine Professor of Political Science and Canadian-
American Studies, who begins with the passage of the Free
Trade Agreement and brings readers up to the current, post
September 11, 2001 era, where trade and border security
concerns have become inextricably combined in the minds
of many, particularly Americans.  
View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm Spring 2003 ·  MAINE POLICY REVIEW  ·  15
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?
INTRODUCTION
My task is to provide readers with a succinct and hopefully useful overview of the Canadian-
American trade relationship leading up to the passage
of the Free Trade Agreement (Canada and the United
States) and North American Free Trade Agreement
(Mexico, Canada, and the United States) because, 
in myriad ways, they reflect historical paradigms. 
The saga of North American trade patterns has been
shaped and defined by economic forces, political
agendas, social and cultural considerations, and 
ideals of nationalism and sovereignty. Familiarity and
similarities notwithstanding, the current trade relation-
ships also raise questions about what—if anything—
is unique about them.
The essence of the Canadian-American relation-
ship over the last two centuries can be encapsulated 
by two quotes from history, the first of which comes
from Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Trudeau
—a towering political figure in Canada who was
either loved or reviled depending on which side of
the political divide one stood—first took office in
1968 and stepped down for the last time in 1984.
Throughout his tenure, he professed a decided
ambivalence about the United States. For example, 
he was an extreme critic of the ongoing Vietnam 
War and, generally, expressed a wariness about 
having a close relationship with the United States on
a variety of levels. Shortly after taking office, Trudeau
remarked about the Canadian-American relationship,
“living next to you [Americans], is in some ways like
sleeping with an elephant; no matter how friendly 
or even-tempered is the beast…one is affected by
every twitch and grunt.”
With his customary wit, Trudeau summed up
two sentiments that are held by many Canadians
even today. The first is that although it is generally
considered favorable living next door to the United
States, Canadians are affected dramatically by its
every action and policy. The second is that Trudeau
captured the ambivalence many Canadians shared
and continue to have about
establishing a closer trading
relationship with the United
States.
In contrast, 50 years prior
to Trudeau’s now famous
comment, United States
President William Howard Taft
remarked publicly that he hoped
that Canada—by engaging in
more trade with the Americans
—would diminish its historic
ties with Great Britain and move
ever closer to the United States.
Although Taft did not elaborate
on what he meant by his
“parting of the ways” observa-
tion, some American politicians
at the time were exploring the
concept of a single continental trading arrangement; a
few even hinted at the possibility of the future annexa-
tion of Canada. Thus, Taft articulated a pervasive senti-
ment held by Americans even today, which links closer
economic and cultural ties with Canada to some form 
of formalized political connection.
These two quotes from Prime Minister Trudeau 
in the 1960s and President Taft a half century earlier
capture much of the ideals and tensions that have
existed in the trading relationship between Canada 
and the United States over the last two centuries. This
article provides a whirlwind overview of Canadian-
American trade beginning with the Revolutionary War
era. Two themes underpin and define this brief history:
first, the expansion of trade between the two countries
did not unfold in a linear fashion; instead it was subject
to periods of expansion as well as retraction. Second,
sharply mixed opinions exist on both sides of the
border even today about the wisdom of forming a
closer trading relationship, especially among Canadians.
Importantly, this ambivalence, and sometimes outright
opposition, can often be visibly detected in border
states such as Maine.
…sharply mixed
opinions exist on
both sides of the
border even today
about the wisdom
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THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR ERA
The American Revolutionary War represents thegreat divide between what is now called Canada
and the United States. Thirteen colonies carved them-
selves off from the British Empire and its remaining
North American colonies, and began a republican
experiment in the late eighteenth century. The colonies
to the north, which did not join in this enterprise, were
called British North America until, in 1867, four
reconfigured their relationship with Great Britain to
form the Dominion of Canada.
The carving process in 1776 was not only 
politically defined, but also social and cultural in
nature. Nonetheless, the trade relationship between
the colonies and the states did not cease. Instead it
remained strong, especially in New England and 
the Atlantic region of British North America. In
fact, it continued to thrive through the late eigh-
teenth century and into the early nineteenth century,
despite the outbreak of the War of 1812 that was
triggered, in part, because the Americans were
extremely upset over having their trade disrupted on
the high seas by Britain’s vaunted navy. Vibrant
trade—both legal and illegal—continued
throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Intriguing tales of illegal trade are well
remembered in places like Passamaquoddy Bay,
which was an illicit trader’s haven, and also in
Vermont’s Smuggler’s Notch, which gained a noto-
rious reputation as a trading route for illegally
moving goods northward across the border.
THE ANNEXATION MOVEMENT
In the mid-nineteenth century, a couple of eventsshook up and redefined the relationship between the
young and rapidly expanding United States and the
remaining colonies in British North America. The first
event occurred in the 1840s, when Great Britain moved
aggressively to embrace the principles of free trade.
Because Great Britain was leading the world industri-
ally, it was well positioned to open up markets around
the globe, and it experienced some measure of success
in doing so. However, the British North American
colonies, which were still directly attached to Britain,
found themselves struggling with the ramifications 
of this policy. This kindled numerous discussions and
political debates about crafting a closer trade relation-
ship with the United States as one way of coping with
Britain’s move to free trade. 
In 1849, this thinking underpinned what was
quickly dubbed the Annexation Movement. Roughly
300 merchants in Montreal began to articulate publicly
the idea of joining the United States. Their argument
was strictly economic and, on those grounds, annexa-
tion of the fledgling British North American colonies
to the United States made perfect sense. In fact, the
merchants argued, a continental trade zone was essen-
tially a foregone conclusion, so why not enter into
robust negotiations with the Americans? 
Obviously, the annexation movement failed.
Nonetheless, it left behind a viewpoint that persists
even today, which is that tighter trade relations
between Canada and the United States might blur 
the boundaries between the two countries to the point
where they will ultimately disappear. Canadians, in
particular, still wrestle with this notion, often with a
sense of foreboding.
RECIPROCITY, 1854-1866
The trade relationship between British NorthAmerica and the United States (and, in particular,
between New England and present-day Quebec)
Intriguing tales of illegal trade are well
remembered in places like Passamaquoddy
Bay, which was an illicit trader's haven. . .
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continued to gain pace through the 1850s. Formal
trading routes were established and railroads began
to crisscross eastern North America. In 1853, the
Saint Lawrence and Atlantic Railway opened; it
brought goods from Montreal to Portland—Maine’s
so-called “ice-free” port. This route was especially
important during the winter months, when the
frozen Saint Lawrence River prohibited maritime
trade. Later, this railway was incorporated into the
Grand Trunk Railway. 
At the same time, other railways began to reach
both eastward and westward across the continent.
Trading routes continued to be strengthened and
many citizens on both sides of the border enthusias-
tically discussed and debated the merits of facili-
tating trade and improving an infrastructure of
railways and waterways that would link more closely
British North America and the United States. The
push to expand trade between the two countries
came to fruition in an agreement called Reciprocity,
which lasted from 1854-1866. 
As its name implies, Reciprocity was a reciprocal
trade agreement between the British North American
colonies and the United States, and it suited both 
their needs, at least in certain sectors of the economy.
For the Americans, on the eve of the traumatic Civil
War, it appealed to both southerners and northerners.
Southerners applauded the idea because they thought 
it would strengthen British North America to better
withstand Northern pressures. Northerners championed
Reciprocity for the opposite reason; some thought it
would be a crucial step toward the ultimate annexation
of British North America. The end result was that
many Americans embraced the idea of strengthening
trade with the British North American colonies.
On the other side of the border, most British
North Americans supported the idea because they 
had ample staple goods—in particular fish, farming,
mining, and timber products—that they wanted to
move to the United States. Thus, the overriding issue
for Canadian producers was to increase their ability 
to sell primary resources in the United States without
confronting the obstacle of a large tariff barrier. 
Reciprocity lasted 12 years, ending in the wake of
the American Civil War. Historians have long identified 
a rosy glow that accompanied memories of this period.
Reciprocity is typically recalled as a powerful and gener-
ally positive arrangement and, even though terminated
by the Americans in 1866, this recollection shaped
future conversations about trade between the two coun-
tries. In fact, economic and political leaders on both sides
of the border revisited the issue of reciprocity every
decade until it became a reality again in the 1980s.
THE “AGE OF PROTECTIONISM”
Upon terminating the Reciprocity agreement, theUnited States moved aggressively in the late nine-
teenth century to protect its markets by instituting
some of the highest tariffs in the country’s history. 
The notorious McKinley Tariff in 1890, for example,
applied an average tax of almost 50% on imported
items. By erecting such high tariffs, American politi-
cians and businessmen sought to shield their own
emerging industries. This era, remembered by many 
as the age of protectionism, witnessed similar actions
unfolding on the other side of the border.
As mentioned above, four provinces (Ontario,
Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia) banded
together to form the Dominion of Canada in 1867.
One of the important agenda items of the new
Canadian administration, led by Sir John A. Macdonald,
was to create a National Policy in the 1870s. Thus,
while the Americans were throwing up high tariff
barriers, the Canadians reciprocated with their own
National Policy. 
Like American programs at the time, and for 
similar reasons, Prime Minister Macdonald’s National
Policy imposed high tariffs to safeguard the country’s
fledgling industries. It also called for the aggressive
development of Canada’s western territory, the
construction of an intercontinental railway system, and
other improvements in the country’s transportation
infrastructure. The National Policy included schemes to
attract large numbers of immigrants who would help to 
turn the country into an agricultural powerhouse, 
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and thanks to the efforts of administrators appointed by
one of Macdonald’s successors, Liberal Prime Minister
Wilfrid Laurier, this aspect of the National Policy
enjoyed phenomenal success. Canada’s burgeoning
wheat production in the early twentieth century
provided compelling evidence of this accomplishment. 
THE “PROGRESSIVE ERA”
The protectionist pendulum began to swing back in the early part of the twentieth century. In the
United States, politicians, economists and social scien-
tists studied trade intensively, and concluded that a
move to reduce tariffs or to promote general free trade
would be advantageous for American interests. The
Canadians were engaged in a similar discussion largely
because their producers of staple items, especially
farmers in the developing West, wanted to move their
products into American markets. Once again, the two
countries revisited the issue of reciprocity. 
In 1911 discussions between the two countries
culminated when they came close to enacting parallel
trade legislation that would have dramatically reduced
most tariffs. William Howard Taft was president of the
United States; Wilfrid Laurier was prime minister of
Canada, a position he had held since 1896. Most of
the tariffs both countries wanted to drop governed
staple items such as fish, timber goods, and farming
products. The two countries engaged in a protracted
series of negotiations. The United States Senate quickly
passed its version of the reciprocity agreement and
then waited for the Canadians to enact parallel legisla-
tion that would have implemented the arrangement.
However, the Canadian supporters of reciprocity
encountered dramatic obstacles in their attempts to
follow suit. In essence, efforts in Canada ground to 
a halt on the issue of reciprocity. The federal election
campaign of 1911 became, in large part, a referendum
on the issue, and Canadians found themselves dramati-
cally divided over whether such legislation furthered
their national and business interests. Prime Minister
Laurier’s Liberal party aggressively promoted the idea
of reciprocity, maintaining that a tighter trade relation-
ship with the United States would ultimately
strengthen Canada. The opposition Conservative party
cleverly argued that reciprocity would be catastrophic
for the country’s future. Led by the articulate politician
Robert Laird Borden, opponents argued persuasively
that if Canadians enacted parallel reciprocal trade legis-
lation, the country might cease to exist. Over time, they
maintained, the boundaries between the two countries
would become less and less important in a reciprocal
trade environment. 
The Conservative argument triumphed; indeed, 
in 1911, the Liberals went down in defeat. Reciprocity
was not embraced by the Canadians, and the agreement
to enact parallel legislation collapsed. It did so largely
because the Conservatives successfully employed what
was then, and is still today, an emotionally charged
argument among Canadians: A closer trade relationship
with the United States might lead to a form of conti-
nentalism and thus facilitate the demise of Canada as
an independent nation-state.
THE 1920s AND EARLY DEPRESSION 
Notwithstanding the failure of a reciprocal tradeagreement in 1911, the economies of both Canada
and the United States burgeoned in the early twentieth
century. This can be attributed in part to the First World
War, when industrial booms took place on both sides 
of the border to support the allied efforts. In terms of
understanding the trade relationship between the two
countries, the 1920s marks a decade when Canada
crossed two significant divides. One is that during that
decade Canada’s most important trade relationship—
as defined by import and export volume—statistically
shifted from Great Britain to the United States. The
second is that for the first time in history total invest-
ment dollars flowing from the United States to Canada
exceeded the infusion of pounds from Great Britain. 
For one dramatic example, by 1929 American investors
owned over one-third of Canada’s pulp and paper
industry. American corporations energetically engaged 
in the construction of branch plants in Canada, with
investment for capital construction and operations
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flowing into Canada and profit dollars flowing back 
to corporate head offices in the United States. 
An old saying that makes the rounds in studies 
of the Canadian-American relationship applies with
special relevance during this time: “When the United
States sneezes, Canada catches a cold.” This notion was
clearly illustrated when the American stock market
experienced its famous crash late in 1929, an event that
helped to trigger the Great Depression of the ensuing
decade. Although North Americans recall the trauma 
of this economic collapse with particular poignancy, 
it was in fact part of an international depression. 
For Canadians, virtually all of the investment dollars
flowing from the United States dried up by 1930.
Canadians found themselves mired in a depression 
that, statistically speaking, was even bleaker than that
experienced by their neighbors to the south.
Although trade between the two countries had
been steadily increasing throughout the 1920s, both
countries reacted to the Great Depression by throwing
up high tariff barriers. President Herbert Hoover and
many congressional politicians advocated bold protec-
tionism to save the American economy. In Canada,
Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King was replaced
by Conservative Richard Bedford Bennett soon after
the start of the Great Depression. Like Hoover, Bennett
called for high tariffs as a means to protect Canadian
interests; armed with such tariffs, he promised to “blast”
the country out of the quagmire of depression.
MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS
Unfortunately for both countries, high tariff barriersonly exacerbated the situation. Rather than
propelling their way out of the financial doldrums,
Canadians and Americans became mired in an even
deeper depression largely as a result of their “solution”
of exorbitantly high tariff barriers. By 1935, despite 
the good will generated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
famous New Deal (he was elected president in1933), 
it was evident that a new trade model for the North
American countries was needed. After a series of negoti-
ations in 1935—Mackenzie King had recently defeated
Bennett to regain his position of prime minister—
the two countries formalized a new relationship that
granted each other “most-favored-nation status.” 
In practical terms, the trading partners formulated
a series of agreements that facilitated the movement 
of goods across the border. Interestingly, most of the
Canadian goods exported to the United States were
staple items, whereas most of the American goods
flowing north were manufactured commodities. The
granting of most-favored-nation status, therefore,
embodied an intriguing mélange of agreements that




late in the Depression years.
The Second World War, which
broke out in Europe in 1939,
accelerated the economic and
defense connections between
Canada and the United States.
This came about largely
because the two countries
swiftly became partners in the
formidable allied relationship
that staved off and ultimately defeated the Axis 
powers of Germany, Japan, and Italy. As a result, the
two North American nations strengthened their mutual
defense structures as well as their economic reliance 
on one another. These dynamics led to important
consequences that would long survive the war, 
particularly for Canada. 
The same two leaders who had negotiated the
most-favored-nation status met at the Roosevelt home-
stead in New York for a series of talks that culminated
in what is called the Hyde Park Agreement in
Canadian-American history. Essentially, the negotiators
built a rudimentary framework for further tightening
the trade relationship between the two countries,
largely to facilitate the closer integration of their
respective wartime defense industries. Interestingly, 
the agreement was negotiated before the December




trade relationship late 
in the Depression years.
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to the United States’ participation in the war. The fact
that an agreement was signed prior to America’s
involvement in the hostilities is an indication of just
how closely the United States planned to work with
the Allied powers even before it became an active
belligerent.
The Hyde Park agreement—and the Second
World War in general—further entrenched the
interconnectedness of the two countries’ economies.
By 1948, the two countries entered into a series 
of negotiations to put together a free trade agree-
ment. Canada was still led by Prime Minister
Mackenzie King, who was in power on and off
throughout the early 1920s to the late 1940s.
Harry S. Truman became president on the death 
of Roosevelt in the closing months of the war 
in 1945. In part, events in North America were
being shaped as Western European ideals gained
hold in the postwar era. Both the Canadians and
Americans played a role in the passage of the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
in 1947, and Canada eagerly participated in
America’s successful Marshall Plan for the recon-
struction of a war-torn Western Europe.
Still, despite transatlantic trends at the time, and
the intertwining of the two countries’ economies,
formal trade negotiations once again failed, largely
because the Canadians balked for some of the same
reasons that were expressed in 1911. Sensing that a
large number of Canadians would perceive an even
closer trading relationship with the United States as an
indicator of the erosion of Canadian sovereignty, King
pulled out of the negotiations.
THE AUTO PACT TO THE 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Even without a formal agreement, however, tradecontinued apace into the 1950s and through the
1960s. The two countries easily remained each other’s
largest trading partners, and it appeared inevitable
that the relationship would continue to grow closer.
By the 1960s, for example, American interests
accounted for 75% of all foreign investment in
Canada. In 1965, Canada and the United States
entered into the “Auto Pact,” which some scholars
consider a prototype for the Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime
Minister Lester Pearson negotiated a trade agreement
that essentially integrated the automobile industry 
on both sides of the border. Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors interwove the manufacture of parts
and production of their automobiles by using facto-
ries in Canada and the United States. Although the
Auto Pact targeted only one sector of the industrial
economy, the ideal of full integration became a posi-
tive model of what can happen with a closely inte-
grated trading relationship. The Auto Pact garnered
vocal critics in both countries; nonetheless, it served
to fuel the discussion of free trade in the 1980s. 
In 1968, newly elected Prime Minister Pierre
Elliott Trudeau ushered in an era of ambivalence
concerning his country’s relationship with the United
States. This encompassed not only trade, but also other
aspects of foreign and domestic policies. In what was
perhaps a classic example of Trudeau’s ambivalence, 
his administration created the Foreign Investment
Review Agency (FIRA). Following a series of alarming
reports about Canada’s close trading relationship with
the United States that depicted the degree to which the
two economies were integrated, as well as the dramatic
In 1968, newly elected Prime
Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau
ushered in an era of ambivalence
concerning his country’s relation-
ship with the United States.
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level of American ownership of Canada’s industry and
resources, many Canadians expressed a belief that the
country’s independence faced immediate peril.
Although others at the time and since labeled this an
alarmist viewpoint, Trudeau’s administration picked up
on this sentiment and, in response, established FIRA in
1973. The agency consisted of a council charged with
the review of all foreign investment coming into
Canada. The evaluators were to determine whether
these investments would be in the best interests of
Canadians. In practice, FIRA accepted over 90% of the
money coming into Canada, which led critics to blame
Trudeau for creating a costly and lumbering bureau-
cratic enterprise that did nothing to change the status
quo and, perhaps, limited the prospects for Canada’s
future economic growth by souring the country’s rela-
tionship with the United States. 
Despite such criticism, FIRA remained viable 
until the 1980s. However, that decade witnessed a 
sea change of leadership and a transatlantic trend
toward conservatism spearheaded by Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, President Ronald
Reagan in the United States, and Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney in Canada. This convergence of ideological
forces helps to explain the free trade agreement that
later emerged between Canada and the United States.
Conservative ideals, including the desire to lower tariff
barriers and move swiftly toward systems of interna-
tional free trade, enjoyed widespread support in all
three countries. The majority of voters, as measured by
the popularity of political leaders, supported these
trade ideals. Significantly, concerns about an erosion of
sovereignty were muted in Canada. 
To signify this trend, Prime Minister Mulroney
renamed FIRA “Investment Canada.” Although FIRA
was originally designed to scrutinize every dollar
coming into the country, Investment Canada was 
reformulated to encourage and seek out foreign invest-
ment with the idea that more capital would inevitably
serve Canada’s interests. Thus, the stage was set for 
a protracted series of negotiations that ultimately led 
to the passage of the 1989 Free Trade Agreement
between Canada and the United States.
CONCLUSION 
This brief historical overviewof trade between Canada
and the United States from the
Revolutionary War era to the
eve of the current FTA and its
successor, NAFTA, illustrates
two powerful themes. First, the
idea of free trade between the
two countries is not a recent
concept; it is instead an old
ideal that has been revisited
many times, and partially
embraced on several occasions,
by the two countries. Even
today, the possibility remains of
continued expansion or retrac-
tion of free trade between the
North American partners. 
The second theme is that
there are critics of free trade on
both sides of the border whose
arguments often mirror one
another. Even in the United
States, for example, free trade
opponents argue that a closer
relationship with Canada might
diminish American sovereignty.
As addressed above in several case studies, this belief
replicates Canadian fears that have been articulated since
the nineteenth century. Certainly, the strength of this
viewpoint in Canada and America has waxed and waned
depending on the overall health of the economy and the
agendas of contemporary political and business leaders.
Readers are left to conclude whether or not 
the FTA and NAFTA discussed by Howard Cody in
the next article should be properly considered “old
wine in new bottles.” If the “old wine” of familiar
historical patterns resonates, then the reader is still
challenged by the prospect of evaluating whether or
not it is a vintage that merits its price and is worthy
of continued consumption.  
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